Italian girlfriend

emperorpenguin said:
chaos0xomega said:
I wonder how the war might have been different had the Germans managed to make off with her.... Liberating Ireland and using it as a staging ground? ....

They'd have been 20 years too late to "liberate" Ireland, they were independent since 1922 :wink:

You mean N. Ireland isn't a British territory anymore :wink:

ANYWAY, according to Aldades post, the result of the Italian surrender can best be summarised as: "Italy betrayed the Germans and gave 200-some-odd ships to the Royal Navy, when they could have done the smart thing and given it to the Kriegsmarin. 206 additional ships, including 3 battleships, in 1943, could have gone a long way towards prolonging the war and possibly gaining Germany a victory over Europe.

On the other hand, possibly not, as it can be easily argued that commerce raiding was nowhere near as effective as the German Admiralty hoped for.
 
A little bit impractical to give the fleet to the Germans as they would have had to sail it through the straits of Gibraltar or the Suez canal to get it to secure Kriegsmarine bases capable of dealing with such a fleet (the Italians lost the Roma just getting it to Malta). Besiges the Germans had more pressing calls on their resources than operating a conventional fleet. By this time they had lost (or were about to loose) the biggest tank battle history and North Africa and the tide had turned in Russia.

The whole point of the Italian surrender is that they could see the way the wind was blowing and wanted to be on the winning side.
 
Actually, the whole point of the surrender was that the italian people didn`t want to enter the war to start with, but Il Duce had pledged allegiance to germany in a fast effort to expand the Mare Nostrum and the italian N-african empire.
Overambition (2.5 mill bayonets, the russia disaster,...) made that the army consisted of very, very good elite units that where second to none (the Paracuditisti, Alpini, Bersaglieri,...) but in far to small numbers to make a difference, and an overabundance of out dated guns, light tanks and unmotivated fucilieri, and often incompetent officers comming from the civilian reserve troops.

They handed their navy to the allies after their surrender in order to save their homeland as a `war payment` and then on the 11th declared war on germany as the CIL was formed. The RSI on the other hand stayed and fought with the germans at the Gothic line in the north of italy, which caused italians fighting italians in small numbers, though on general italian units on both sides refused to engage their countrymen unless (mostly from the CCNN Blackshirts and other more `fanatical` troops) they had very great german sympathies.
 
chaos0xomega said:
emperorpenguin said:
chaos0xomega said:
I wonder how the war might have been different had the Germans managed to make off with her.... Liberating Ireland and using it as a staging ground? ....

They'd have been 20 years too late to "liberate" Ireland, they were independent since 1922 :wink:

You mean N. Ireland isn't a British territory anymore :wink:

ANYWAY, according to Aldades post, the result of the Italian surrender can best be summarised as: "Italy betrayed the Germans and gave 200-some-odd ships to the Royal Navy, when they could have done the smart thing and given it to the Kriegsmarin. 206 additional ships, including 3 battleships, in 1943, could have gone a long way towards prolonging the war and possibly gaining Germany a victory over Europe.

On the other hand, possibly not, as it can be easily argued that commerce raiding was nowhere near as effective as the German Admiralty hoped for.

Actually, commerce raiding proved very succesfull until on a sunny sunday morning in a harbour on Hawaii, of the 6th december 1941, japan made the CAPITAL blunder of awakening `The Great machine`.
Now the States could openly enter the war and as a consequence convoy protection duty and all went up greatly and the Wolfpack couldn`t hold on to its job, even when the `electrical sub` started to make an appearance.
 
Keith said:
A little bit impractical to give the fleet to the Germans as they would have had to sail it through the straits of Gibraltar or the Suez canal to get it to secure Kriegsmarine bases capable of dealing with such a fleet (the Italians lost the Roma just getting it to Malta). Besiges the Germans had more pressing calls on their resources than operating a conventional fleet. By this time they had lost (or were about to loose) the biggest tank battle history and North Africa and the tide had turned in Russia.

The whole point of the Italian surrender is that they could see the way the wind was blowing and wanted to be on the winning side.

Well, you're right on that last part... but if Mussolini wasn't such a dumbass, he would've given his entire military capability to German military commands in '42 when it became quite obvious that the Italian military commanders SUCKED, and the training was sub-par(aside from the aforementioned elite units).

As for El Alemain (the tank battle in N. Africa), if the Germans had access to the full capability of the Italian fleet, could have been a less grievous loss(and indeed if they had a way to get the Aquila to El Alemain they would have kicked ass - provided they magically found planes capable of carrier launches/landings). Oh, did I mention that El Alemain is pretty much right on the Mediterranean Sea? Shore bombardments would have been easy.

Of course, that requires that El Alemain take place in 1943, and not in 1942 like it really did.

A little bit impractical to give the fleet to the Germans as they would have had to sail it through the straits of Gibraltar or the Suez canal to get it to secure Kriegsmarine bases capable of dealing with such a fleet (the Italians lost the Roma just getting it to Malta).

Im not too familiar with the defences in place on the Rock of Gibraltar at that time(or the allied fleet likely to be there, though it prolly wasn't TOO large), but I'm more than certain that the entirety of the Italian fleet could break through and smash the defences to pieces. Plus, you got to remember the possibility of support coming in from the atlantic from the rest of the Kriegsmarine.

As for Stalingrad, its only 300 miles or so from navigable waters in the Sea of Azov, and Im sure the volga is big enough to allow some smaller naval ships up the river for naval bombardments. Of course, stalingrad was lost in January of 1943, so that meant that it would have probably been too late, although Im sure the presence of a fleet that close to the Russians would have forced them to redirect resources, buying the Germans more time....

Actually, commerce raiding proved very succesfull until on a sunny sunday morning in a harbour on Hawaii, of the 6th december 1941, japan made the CAPITAL blunder of awakening `The Great machine`.
Now the States could openly enter the war and as a consequence convoy protection duty and all went up greatly and the Wolfpack couldn`t hold on to its job, even when the `electrical sub` started to make an appearance.

Ah yes, the Happy time. That was short lived, wasn't it? Commerce Raiding worked well until there was a strong enemy presence escorting the aforementioned commerce, correct? Hence: it didn't work to well.
Although maybe 200+ additional ships including 3 battleships and an aircraft carrier that would have probably never recieved a compliment of aircraft thanks to Goering might have changed that situation...
 
There where actually 2 El Alamein campaigns, the first in late august (Operation Brandung) and was repelled at Alam Halfa by `Monty`, the second started on 23rd of october by the british and lasted 10 days before DAK gave way. Bit unlogical though to class it as `the tank battle of N-africa`, since all desert warfare is tank battle in nature, even the Kasserine Pass was mostly fought by tanks and AT guns... Apart from that are naval bombardements in desert warfare (back then, without lasers, satellites etc) pretty useless as there are no decent landmarks to base the ranging attempts on, and where it could be used (port cities like Tobruk) they had to be carefull not to smash all the storage and anchoring locations to pieces.

DAK on paper never had command over CAM and Italo-Tedesco, but in effect Rommel took overal command. The failure of CAM was mostly that apart from a lack of motivation, it`s `feeling inferior` was actually further enhanced by the Germans (except Von Kesselring) who classified ALL Italian units as second grade, rear guard forces. 3th Indian Motor Company surely disagrees when asked how second graded Ariete was hehehe...

Do not be amazed, but the axis actually had most of the airpower in the desert warfare till the last weeks of `42, all landbased as carriers needed to escort the vital trade and supply lanes over the seas, and planes had neither the speed, nor the reach, nor the orientation equipment for the disorientating desert landscape that exist today, to make timely and precise arrivals for the highly mobile form of desert warfare DAK preferred. The Italian Navy at that time lay in harbour repairing from either the Taranto raid AND the lack of fuel (Caio Duilio and Andrea Doria spend the whole 1942 and 43 till the surrender fuelless in the harbour, Vittorio Veneto and Roma underwent repairs in 1942, and Littorio, by then renamed Italia, was kept in harbour to avoid a lucky kill like the Hood had suffered, as she was the `projection of the Naval power of the House of Savoia` aka the fleets flagship). The Regia Escrito and the Regia Aeronautica literally vanished in thin air at the surrender (aka, the troops went home).

Naval bombardements at Stalingrad... not likely, every river was frozen close in `42-`43 except the Don, but its not a good idea to send ships over a river with two armies facing of over its banks... And a small ship on a river is a deadsentence. No where to run or hide from big AT guns, tank guns, airplanes etc etc and EVERYONE can see the boat so you won`t even be able to hide for repairs.
 
chaos0xomega said:
emperorpenguin said:
chaos0xomega said:
I wonder how the war might have been different had the Germans managed to make off with her.... Liberating Ireland and using it as a staging ground? ....

They'd have been 20 years too late to "liberate" Ireland, they were independent since 1922 :wink:

You mean N. Ireland isn't a British territory anymore :wink: .

You didn't say northern Ireland :wink:
 
Twin-Linked Aldades said:
Actually, commerce raiding proved very succesfull until on a sunny sunday morning in a harbour on Hawaii, of the 6th december 1941, japan made the CAPITAL blunder of awakening `The Great machine`.
Now the States could openly enter the war and as a consequence convoy protection duty and all went up greatly and the Wolfpack couldn`t hold on to its job, even when the `electrical sub` started to make an appearance.
Actually this was the beginning of the U-boat's "Happy Time". The US admiral had a thing against the British and refused to use information from ULTRA. This combined with the fact that the RN admiratly codes had been broken by the Germans made this a very bad time to be an allied merchant seaman.

I do agree that the raiding campaign was successful. According to many history books the battle of the Atlantic was Churchill's highes priority and the cause for greatest concern after the Battle of Brittain.
 
Martime trade was our lifeblood. If we couldn't get goods in from the empire and our trading partners we were well and truly screwed. Without securing the convoys we couldn't prosecute the war in Europe, Africa or the Far East. The Battle of the Atlantic being top priority isn't really a surprise... :wink:
 
Keith said:
Twin-Linked Aldades said:
Actually, commerce raiding proved very succesfull until on a sunny sunday morning in a harbour on Hawaii, of the 6th december 1941, japan made the CAPITAL blunder of awakening `The Great machine`.
Now the States could openly enter the war and as a consequence convoy protection duty and all went up greatly and the Wolfpack couldn`t hold on to its job, even when the `electrical sub` started to make an appearance.
Actually this was the beginning of the U-boat's "Happy Time". The US admiral had a thing against the British and refused to use information from ULTRA. This combined with the fact that the RN admiratly codes had been broken by the Germans made this a very bad time to be an allied merchant seaman.

I do agree that the raiding campaign was successful. According to many history books the battle of the Atlantic was Churchill's highes priority and the cause for greatest concern after the Battle of Brittain.

Actually this was the second happy time, the first being in the winter-sping 1940/41. This frst period was a lot more dangerous to Britain than the time off American from January 1942. The Battle of the Atlantic was not a priority or rather it was not more of a priority than many other pressing commitments. Churchill never saw it as a great concern at the time - this has been discussed before :wink: or rather I can't remember on which thread I wrote about this.

The Battle of Britain was another one of these popular myths to emerge from the war. Not to downplay the effect of the RAF, but it was the naval forces that provided the real deterrent effect to any German invasion attempt. Neither the German army or Navy were going to cross the channel as long as significant parts of the RN remained operational.
 
chaos0xomega said:
Although maybe 200+ additional ships including 3 battleships and an aircraft carrier that would have probably never recieved a compliment of aircraft thanks to Goering might have changed that situation...

The Me109s modified for carrier operations did exist, the squadrons were operational and spent most of their time as part of the air defence of Norway.
 
They would have been complete pigs to operate at sea though, even worse than Seafires :)

I've been made aware of some interesting flight operations facts regarding GZ. It would appear that her catapults would have been capable of launching up to 9 aircraft at the rate of about 1 per minute (not too shabby) but that they would then require at least 50 minutes to repressurise, during which time air operations wouild have to cease. Thus, in action, GZ would be limited to launching a maximum strike of 18 aircraft (or in VAS terms, 3 flights), waiting between 5 and 8 turns before launching could resume.

Apparently the arrestor gear was also seriously underdesigned, which would have made the 109T's landings even more hairier than they would otherwise have been!
 
How reliant were WWII carriers on steam catapults anyway?

I thought most of the aircraft operated from them could launch from the deck under their own power, paricularly if they were on a fast carrier launching into the wind. It was my belief that catapults were essential only for the lauching of modern jets (with stall speeds of approx 140 knots - not too far off the cruising speeds of some of the slower bombers of the age and faster than the 138 knot max speed of the swordfish).

Still handy on a WWII carrier though if it meant you could carry out air operations without altering course.
 
Jellicoe said:
chaos0xomega said:
Although maybe 200+ additional ships including 3 battleships and an aircraft carrier that would have probably never recieved a compliment of aircraft thanks to Goering might have changed that situation...

The Me109s modified for carrier operations did exist, the squadrons were operational and spent most of their time as part of the air defence of Norway.

Wow, I literally learn something new everyday.

But I thought that Goering refused to allow any form of aircraft to be made available to carriers(except old junkers he didn't want anymore)?

I've been made aware of some interesting flight operations facts regarding GZ. It would appear that her catapults would have been capable of launching up to 9 aircraft at the rate of about 1 per minute (not too shabby) but that they would then require at least 50 minutes to repressurise, during which time air operations wouild have to cease. Thus, in action, GZ would be limited to launching a maximum strike of 18 aircraft (or in VAS terms, 3 flights), waiting between 5 and 8 turns before launching could resume.

Apparently the arrestor gear was also seriously underdesigned, which would have made the 109T's landings even more hairier than they would otherwise have been!

That leads me to believe that the GZ would have been very ineffective as a proper aircraft carrier, although if it remained within range of a friendly airbase it could have been a tad more effective...
 
chaos0xomega said:
But I thought that Goering refused to allow any form of aircraft to be made available to carriers(except old junkers he didn't want anymore)?

That leads me to believe that the GZ would have been very ineffective as a proper aircraft carrier, although if it remained within range of a friendly airbase it could have been a tad more effective...

This is correct. The exact arrangements were never sorted out so it never became a problem as to who was responsible for what, when, where and how. The squadrons did exist though. The navy-airforce command arrangements were always strained thoughout the war.

Why should the GZ have been an effective carrier :)? It was the first one to be designed and built by the German navy. Look at the performance of the other nation's first carriers. It took a good 1-2 decades to get good workable designs into operation. The German navy tried to jump this step and forgo any proper testing and experimentation. The GZ design benefitted a lot from intelligence gathering and good designers, but still it was attempting a bit much in too short a timer period. Hence also the reason why the 2nd and 3rd carriers were quietly postponed.
 
Chernobyl said:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steam_catapult

Chern

The entry is not conclusive about the necessity of calapults in WWII but it does make it clear that they were highly desirable. I was thinking of the steam catapult (not perfected until the 50s according to this link).

Thanks for the link.
 
Jellicoe said:
The Battle of Britain was another one of these popular myths to emerge from the war. Not to downplay the effect of the RAF, but it was the naval forces that provided the real deterrent effect to any German invasion attempt. Neither the German army or Navy were going to cross the channel as long as significant parts of the RN remained operational.

How long would the RN have been able to operate in the English channel, or at least close enough to be able to prevent landings, without air cover?
 
Carrier aviation and destroyer/cruiser AAA, I suppose... hardly ideal, but they'd only have needed to avoid being sunk long enough to slaughter an invasion force.

Plus, it's not like the Luftwaffe had a serious chance of actually destroying the RAF...
 
Keith said:
Jellicoe said:
The Battle of Britain was another one of these popular myths to emerge from the war. Not to downplay the effect of the RAF, but it was the naval forces that provided the real deterrent effect to any German invasion attempt. Neither the German army or Navy were going to cross the channel as long as significant parts of the RN remained operational.

How long would the RN have been able to operate in the English channel, or at least close enough to be able to prevent landings, without air cover?

They wouldn't have stopped any landings. Due to the submarine and air threat they were based in Scapa Flow, about as far from the potential landing beaches as possible. What the RN would have done was to smash the invasion fleet afterwards leaving the Germans cut off and out of supply.
Academic anyway since Sealion a) never happened and b) was a bluff
 
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