Imperial Battleships

As I recall, with the event of ye steam engine and ironcladding, the Russian started constructing first class armoured cruisers, that the Royal Navy had to figure how to hunt down, and mission kill, to protect their trade routes.

The last gasp of that would have been the Deutschland class panzerschiff, though it seems that the British eleven kilotonne Town class light cruisers were supposedly being prepped to disrupt the Japanese commercial shipping, except the Germans got in the way first.

Inbetween, Fisher came up with the dreadnought armoured cruiser, as being an overall cheaper and more efficient solution to cruiser hunter killer, and fleet scouting.
Yes, there have been lots of different roles and doctrines for various cruiser and battlecruiser designs over the past century and a half since they became a category and not just a mission description. It's essentially impossible to make a sweeping statement that covers the intended doctrine for light, heavy, armoured, protected, torpedo, merchant, aviation, anti-aviation, guided-missile, auxiliary and battle cruisers.
 
Sadly there just isn't enough information on battlecruisers to really have this argument. The reason for that was because they didn't have enough time to exist as a warship from the time they were designed to the time surface ships became irrelevant. The RN was the only navy that built and operated them in any sort of quantity, and it had mixed results with them. When using them properly (first battle of the Falklands) battlecruisers worked very well against cruisers. At Jutland German battlecruisers engaged with one another and the Germans sank the BC Invincible. So in this case the ships were fighting against their same class. Jutland also showed that battleships had a definite superiority over battlecruisers - the larger calibers of the battlecruisers worked overly well against the lighter armor they were clad in.

WW1 also showed how light cruisers could do well in the scouting roles that they were well suited for. To the issue of whether or not they were good commerce raiders, there was an imbalance in merchant trade between the central powers and the west. England had a larger fleet because it needed a larger fleet to protect it's far-flung empire and merchant fleets. Germany had a smaller economy and did not have the specific need for a larger navy - so it concentrated on building a navy for specific purpose - being able to challenge the RN in the North Sea. The RN didn't need to build commerce raiders that were not actual warships because it had a plethora of surface combatants. It did, however, need hulls to enforce the blockade of Germany, so it's commerce raiders were deployed more for interdiction than actual raiding. Germany though needed commerce raiders in the form of merchant ships because it didn't have the bases or enough hulls to do what the RN was doing. So the conditions were somewhat similar, but not a true vis-a-vis set of needs.

The advent of aircraft fundamentally changed surface warfare, first for scouting and then to fundamentally change the nature of sea warfare.
 
Yes, there have been lots of different roles and doctrines for various cruiser and battlecruiser designs over the past century and a half since they became a category and not just a mission description. It's essentially impossible to make a sweeping statement that covers the intended doctrine for light, heavy, armoured, protected, torpedo, merchant, aviation, anti-aviation, guided-missile, auxiliary and battle cruisers.
Well... I suppose it depends on how much one stepped back on the doctrinal discussion. While technology changed, the ships changed as well. WW1 didn't have much in the way of AA armament since aircraft weren't really a threat. As we see with the Repulse and Prince of Wales, without sufficient defenses major combatants are easy prey for aircraft. By the latter stages of WW2 the deployment of rapid-fire proximity fused guns and the cramming of AA armament onboard ships turned a well-trained fleet into a very dangerous hedgehog for any attacking aircraft. Had the IJN possessed a better trained and experienced air corps that did not have to devolve into suicide tactics we might have different information to discuss.

Modern missile-armed cruisers traded in armor and guns for electronics and OTH attack tactics. But fundamentally destroyers retained their function as fleet escorts and anti-submarine platforms - they just did it differently with ASROC, helo's and towed sonar arrays instead of depth charges, hedgehogs and ramming to sink a submarine.
 
Well... I suppose it depends on how much one stepped back on the doctrinal discussion. While technology changed, the ships changed as well. WW1 didn't have much in the way of AA armament since aircraft weren't really a threat. As we see with the Repulse and Prince of Wales, without sufficient defenses major combatants are easy prey for aircraft. By the latter stages of WW2 the deployment of rapid-fire proximity fused guns and the cramming of AA armament onboard ships turned a well-trained fleet into a very dangerous hedgehog for any attacking aircraft. Had the IJN possessed a better trained and experienced air corps that did not have to devolve into suicide tactics we might have different information to discuss.

Modern missile-armed cruisers traded in armor and guns for electronics and OTH attack tactics. But fundamentally destroyers retained their function as fleet escorts and anti-submarine platforms - they just did it differently with ASROC, helo's and towed sonar arrays instead of depth charges, hedgehogs and ramming to sink a submarine.
Yes, that again backs up what I was saying: that there have been varied and continuously-developing "cruiser tactics" throughout the past century and a half. You are right about the IJN version, although light cruiser (the main anti-aviation variants) roles, specifications and tactics in the later Pacific theatre, which were a reaction to the IJN force profile, were very different to those in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, let alone those of heavy cruisers, for instance the Exeter at the River Plate or the Norfolk and Suffolk in the pursuit of the Bismarck (or the Dorsetshire in the later stages of the action), let alone the role of the Prinz Eugen on the other side!
 
Sadly there just isn't enough information on battlecruisers to really have this argument. The reason for that was because they didn't have enough time to exist as a warship from the time they were designed to the time surface ships became irrelevant.

In other words, it is a great general term candidate to use for an Imperial top-of-the-line Fleet Combatant or Cruiser . . . 😉
 
FFW boardgame actually gives you a reason for Cruisers to exist in the Traveller universe (as opposed to the 20th Century Terra context which most of the last few pages has been devoted to).
You can load up a high-jump streamlined CRURON or three with some jump troops or Marines and skip off into hostile territory to raise hell, attack commerce and generally make a nuisance of yourself. Even better if you give the Fleet a low-planning factor admiral in command who can get inside the enemy OODA loop. The defender has to either suffer the effects or devote a disproportionately large force to deterring or chasing down the cruiser raiding force.
 
As I recall, Fisher was ahead of his time.

Mostly.

He identified that you needed speed in order to place the unit in the correct position in time, and fire power in order to achieve the mission.

The dreadnought armoured cruiser is an evolved armoured cruiser, with better speed and firepower.

The German response, being somewhat hoodwinked, was the ultimate armoured cruiser.

Since the Confederation Navy has three canonical examples of battlecruisers, two classes which actually were put pen to paper, and one class just hinted at as part of their current order of battle, I am having a go at figuring out how and why.

The way I see it, the difference, besides protection, should be range.

Opening up the possibility that the Azhantis are actually light battlecruisers.
 
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