British 16 inch guns

jbickley00 said:
The trouble with the Italian Navy was not the ships, the ships were world class, the trouble with the Italian navy is that its commanders lacked initiative, committment and aggression and it ships lacked radar.

I thing that it's not a problem of commander but it affect the whole country. I have read that little unit fight courageously and efficiently when they had something to fight for but the whole nation don't agree with the wars and a numerous of them turn to the allied as soon as they take foot in Italy.

This affect lot of strategical and tactical behavior : commanders don't dare fighting the army to have air support, refuse to risk their ship so they don't be blamed and don't try to stand when their enemy overwhelm them.
 
I absolutely agree, the fact that the Italians were not utterly comitted to the war lies at the heart of the command problems with the navy. One of the underlying assumptions of any wargame involving the italian fleet is that the game commanders are more committed than the acutal commanders were.

I was trying to evaluate, not simpy criticize.
 
I agree to an extend about the command issue, but I think the command structure was more to blame than individual commanders. De Zara was let of the leash, and he showed what could be done with his ships, however Iachino who, in my opinion at least, was a much more talented commander but constricted at every turn with orders to preserve the battle fleet, achieved comparitivly little with the greater tools at his disposal. There are cases where Italian commanders deliberately put themselves under German navy command to escape the control of Comando Supremo.

and Jbickley, you write off my opinions calling me an Italian fanboy, but you yourself have proven a loss of objectivity in categorising me as such. Besides the fact that you're merely casting aspertions. I study many navies, including Austro Hungarian, German (in both wars), British and even Yugoslavian! Please lets not slander eachother. If you want a discussion, lets have one. If you want a flame fest, then I'll bid you good day and ensure I never respond to your posts.

Our main cause of disagreement is simply what was more to blame between propellent charges and muzzle velocity. fine, you take the other line to me. I do not deny that muzzle velocity was a key factor, but I disagree that you can claim the Italian Navy agreed with you on this matter. I suggest that the Italian Navy concentrated on lessening THAT particular problem because they had very little control over the manufacturers and qualtity of ammunition they recieved.
Either way the guns and equipment were accurate - you just have to read British accounts which almost universally say they were straddled very early on, but the inability to concentrate salvos was what prevented Italian gunnery being decisive.
 
I think the longest ranged hit achieved on a moving target is something like 23,000 yards?

~26,000 yards from Warspite against Guilio Cesare at Punta Stilo, also Scharnhorst against Glorious at the same range a little while later.
 
they had very little control over the manufacturers and qualtity of ammunition they recieved

A common problem for navies, but worse for some than others. Its also a salutory reminder that, whilst its fine banding around armour penetration figures to the nth degree those are, in the main, theoretical figures. Performance in action (and in trials, as I have observed at first hand) was often quite different and in many cases a source of bitter disappointment to the operator and designer!
 
I did not mean the fanboy remark to be taken so harshly, and I retract it. I am also a fan of the Italians, and would have lumped myself in that category.

I appreciate your agreement to disagree about the powder charge issue. But you utterly wrote off the muzzel velocity argument, and the gun construction arguement, and yet the italian navy did, in fact, continually attempt to reduce the muzzle veloctity of its wepaons. This is not somethign I made up, the numbers and the history are all readily available.

This Italians had other problems leading to dispersion, including inconsistent shell manufactuing, and naval architecture which regularly place weapons too close together. It was not simply a matter of the powder charges being incosistent. And At times, Italian naval gunfire was very accurate, what ever issues they had with the powder, or the gun design.

A study of the various guns used by the italians, however, does, in fact, show that they had on ongoing problem with unreasonable muzzle velocities.

In contrast to both our arguments, at least one person blamed the projectiles. This is taken from

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNIT_15-50_m1934.htm

"The Model 1934 was extremely accurate and was able to deliver very consistent and predictable patterns with devastating hitting power - with the ammunition used for trials. Unfortunately, the materials and supply process in Italy works differently than it does in most other countries. In the U.S., for example, if one wished to test a sample of 16" shells, they might pull an example from stock, and inspect it directly. In Italy, the firm producing the equipment would have the advantage of providing the item for test, thereby possibly delivering an example which would be of atypically good quality with respect to serialized units. This was the problem with the Model 1934 - the firms producing the ammunition did not all produce projectiles of proper quality. [Admiral Angelo] Iachino complained about this in post-war books. Some actions showed a run of good projectiles, where others were plagued by terribly bad examples. Possibly the greatest contrast was seen between the shooting of Littorio in the first battle of Sirte Gulf and that of Vittorio Veneto in the 28 March Guado encounter. Despite the fact that Littorio was shooting at targets 32,000 yards away while Veneto was attacking at first Orion and afterwards Gloucester at only 24,000 yards, the Littorio's shot groups were significantly more consistent, despite the greater range, doubtlessly owing to a batch of properly fabricated 381-mm projectiles."

I highly recommend the Navweaps site.

DM you are correct in suggesting that armour penetrations discussed here are theoretical, but the orginal point of the thread was to place a dividing line between AP and super AP. I think the theoretical armour penetration is a fine place to begin. After all, the random variables that apply to combat are better summed up in the to his and damage die rolls, and not the statistics of the weapon. What is ultimately more theoretical than wargames design statistics? :)
 
Wishbone said:
I agree to an extend about the command issue, but I think the command structure was more to blame than individual commanders. De Zara was let of the leash, and he showed what could be done with his ships, however Iachino who, in my opinion at least, was a much more talented commander but constricted at every turn with orders to preserve the battle fleet, achieved comparitivly little with the greater tools at his disposal. There are cases where Italian commanders deliberately put themselves under German navy command to escape the control of Comando Supremo.

Sorry to double post, but this might deseeve its own topic. I agree with you that the command structure was the biggest part of the problem. Even so, I often get the feeling that even the inidividual ship commanders were half reluctant to risk themselves or their ships for the cause. I sort of see this as an admirable trait-I mean not wanting to fight for the cause of Fascist world domination is not a bad thing.
 
What is ultimately more theoretical than wargames design statistics?

I agree completely, but there's definitely something about the Italian 15" guns. Theoretically they are excellent weapons, but in just about every set of WW2 naval rules I've used they are rated similarly to RN 15" weapons. In some cases I could easily believe that authors would have looked only at calibre and made the (not unreasonable) assumption that similar calibre weapons would have similar performance characteristics. However, some of these rules have been designed by people who I believe are "up to scratch" as far as researching the details of their subject are concerned (and who are well aware of the theoretical approaches taken in determining the data on the navweaps site, since they correspond with the authors of many of the codes and algorithms used to determine these performance levels). I'd be very surprised if they hadn't gone into this in some detail and hence I have a feeling that there's something odd going on with the actual performance of these weapons. Its a pity this didn't come up last week as I was meeting up with some of my Italian naval chums who could ahve shed some light on the subject. Anyway, I may be having a get together with some other well known gunnery experts in the next few weeks; if I do I'll bring it up as a topic of conversation over a beer or two :)
 
It would be interesting to see the reasoning behind the reduction in performance in this italian gun. Until now I have taken it on faith that it was a 15" like any other and didn't look at it further. But then I am a player, not a designer. I do hope you will keep us advised of anything you learn in this forum, I am going to run it by my Navy Guys in San Diego this weekend.
 
jbickley00 said:
The 16"/45 used on the Nelson class ships, used a relatively lighter shell, at a relatively high velocity, but ended up being a dissappointment. Thus the Hood, and the KGV class ships mounted the 15"/42.
The Nelson guns may have been a dissappoinment but that certainly didnt affect the Hood's or the KGV main armament.
The Hoods 15"/42 guns were fitted and developed earlier than the 16"/45's and the KGV's had later developed and fitted 14" guns to comply with the Washington Treaty at the time.
As such i dont know where the 'thus' fitted in that statement.
But anyway, i like your reasoning further in the thread.
 
Back
Top