VaS and crossing the enemy's 'T' suggestion

Keith said:
As I understand it rossing the "T" dates back to the age of sail. The cannon of the age were very different from the 20th centry large calibre naval guns developed to counter the advent of the Iron clad.

In the Napolionic era the ships had to get very close, so getting a hit was relatively easy. The flight of the solid munitions was flat and the tactic had the added advantage of the shot travelling the length, rather than just across the width of the target.

The advent of long range guns, powered ships vastely complicated targetting (making dodging possibe) and the introduction of explosive shells made a single hit far more effective (negating the advantage gained by a "raking" shot).

By WW1 the tactic was questioned. Once the line of battle became an obsolete naval formation (through the effective use of subs, aircraft and eventually missiles) it all became a bit of a moot point.

I'll only agree that crossing the T was moot after WW2 ended, with the dominance of aircraft, submarines and cruise missiles. It is a common failing that crossing the T is referenced to the age of pre-steel warships. Even Nelson himself did not "cross the T" at Trafalgar, as he actually did the reverse by closing with the opposite line at the bottom of the T and risking the chance (properly as it turned out) that they would fire at long range and miss. This allowed his Victory and his following ships to "break the line" and thus was able to rake the enemy ships and then came alongside of them. Nontheless, Nelson is credited with inventing the tactic I believe. At least it was recognised that the possibility was there to use. The British did a "breaking of the line" again at the Battle of the Saints in 1782. You are quite correct that the short ranges allowed for the heavy shot to run the length of the ship doing great damage. The stern area was where the officers cabins were located and had windows and was very succeptible to attack. While the formation of the Line of Battle was invented by the British it was quickly adopted by other Nations. The crossing of the T maneuver however, was only brought into existance with the advent of fast steel-hulled ships with long-range turreted guns. By obtaining a position with its own line at the head of an opposite force and perpendicular to it (either off of the bow or the stern) the entire force could use its entire broadsides of turret-trainable weapons to place concentrated enfilade-fire upon the lead ship of the enemy line. In return, the enemy lead ship could only return fire with its forward armament. Then, each enemy ship could be dealt with in detail as they exposed themselves. So really, with the advancement in technology of fast steam-powered ships armed with movable turrets, the naval tactic of crossing the T only came into proper use during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Some may disagree about Nelson at Trafalgar, but a proper T-crossing maneuver is completed away from an enemy force and outside of its bow or stern area. Sailing ships actually practiced the tactic of "breaking the line" which was a short-ranged reversal of the "T". Anyone today that thought that the maneuver was outmoded in WW1 and WW2 could be mistaken because it was a practice that was taught in naval academies and was something to be highly desired in a tactical battle. Consider these following sentences and tell me if you think they relate to Nelson's age:

Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the feasible application of combat power. Use of maneuver (mobility) capitalizes on the speed and agility of our forces (platforms and weapons) to gain an advantage in time and space relative to the enemy's vulnerabilities. Whether seen in historic warships "crossing the T," or modern ground forces enveloping an enemy, or forcing the tempo of combat beyond an adversary's ability to respond, maneuver allows us to get ahead of the enemy in several dimensions. Our advantage comes from exploiting the maneuver differential - our superiority in speed and position relative to our adversary.

and here-

New Tactics and Doctrine

The third key innovation in Japan's naval transformation efforts was the development of naval tactics that could take advantage of the new battle fleet's capabilities. Instrumental to the development of Japanese naval tactics was the Japanese Naval Staff College, founded in 1888. The college, still in its infancy during the Sino-Japanese War, was the foundation and promoter of revolutionary naval thought before the Russo-Japanese War.

The college taught naval theory, stressing naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan's concept of decisive battle, while also emphasizing the practical application of naval tactics and the ability of officers to think and make decisions in the heat of battle. Japanese naval thinkers of the day used the existing body of Western naval thought, their own experience, and the results of extensive wargaming to shape their tactics. Central to the formation of naval tactics for the combined fleet was the assumption that Japanese warships would be faster and more maneuverable than those of their adversaries. Given what Japanese tacticians knew about their potential enemies' larger, heavier, older ships, this was not a flawed assumption.

In devising their tactics, the Japanese realized that the best position for achieving the maximum concentration of fires from their naval column was to place their column at a fight angle to that of the enemy, forming the cross bar of the letter T. As British Admiral Jackie Fisher noted during fleet maneuvers in 1901, "The lesson that has been emphasized is that the one all important, immediate imperative step is to form the fleet in one single line at right angles to the direction in which the enemy is sighted.... If both sides practice this golden rule and employ the single line of bearing then the fleet with the superior speed must win; that is, battleships of superior speed'.


Simply stated, the tactic of crossing the T of an enemy line of ships was the single best tactic that exploited "concentration of firepower". If anyone thinks line formations were not used in the 20th century, simply look at most of the photos that exist of steel ships in formations and in battle reports. Keith, please understand that I'm not 'jumping down your throat' in my long answer; it's more that your assertion got me wanting to explain my viewpoint to you and any others reading these discussions with some assertions of my own :D.
 
Well I haven't so mutch knewledge, but my reading about the french navy in WWII doesn't say anything about crossing the T. My understanding is that's because it's not mutch a factor in this period. Ship are fast and fire far, with long loading time compared to maneuver time. If you look at the first picture of the 7° post on this thread ( the 2° where BuShips post picture ) you will see a line of ship in close formation all able to fire ahead where the picture is taken. To achieve such position the ship have only to move the lenght of their beam nothing in regard of one step of move.

IMHO the bonus of seeing large silhouette as nothing to do with guns (AFAIK both situation work nearly the same for this kind of combat) but with targeting : having a greater paralaxe ( seeing the target in a bigger angle ) meen having better range and bearing informations, meen a better firing solution. Work nearly the same way with optic and radar.

So I don't thing crossing the T need so mutch interest unless you planing to use or fight a lot of "brick" ship as WWI one's.
 
Well Hugbiel, it was more in evidence than a lot of people know. Although it was not at a full 90° angle, the Hood was prevented from firing her X & Y turrets at Bismarck due to her closing angle at the bottom of an "Italicised" T :wink:. The surface battles in the Pacific were ripe with the possibilities, namely Java Sea, Surigao Straight (best example in WW2) and also some of the hard-fought actions in the Solomons. As far as reaching outside of WW2 but still keeping inside of stram powered steel hulls with turreted guns, there was the Battle of Tsushima, the Battle of Elli, and the Battle of Jutland. I guess I can just agree to disagree, but this "ain't no small thang" in my long experience in reading of naval combat tactics and history.
 
I answer some argument from the rulemaster. I never dare saying it was not important before, but I see it as a lesser matter in WWII.

The main point IMHO is that a ship conter represent a big space for a ship, and that with proper positioning 'big' ship may avoid the problem. And proper positioning is easier in WWII because of better Com and Control.

But this use space. As a special rule, when space lack it matter much. But on open see, it don't seem to be a great matter.

All exemple of crossing the T, I see is from the fight near the Pacific ilands when space lack, especially when the other got the advantage of having it.
If most fight is to be set on open sea then it seem acceptable to have a rule for crossing the T, senario specific.

The Hood is an other story : she wasn't prevented to fire by the PoW ( or the other side ), she was heading toward the Bismarck to close range as soon as possible so can't used her aft gun.
I didn't think that a trio of Richelieu at somethink like counter contact, 1000 m ( 1" ) one of the other would suffer from that. ( But if they closing against someting like a pair of Littorio and Have a third appearing in their back they may have a problem )
 
Hugbiel said:
I answer some argument from the rulemaster. I never dare saying it was not important before, but I see it as a lesser matter in WWII.

The main point IMHO is that a ship conter represent a big space for a ship, and that with proper positioning 'big' ship may avoid the problem. And proper positioning is easier in WWII because of better Com and Control.

But this use space. As a special rule, when space lack it matter much. But on open see, it don't seem to be a great matter.

All exemple of crossing the T, I see is from the fight near the Pacific ilands when space lack, especially when the other got the advantage of having it.
If most fight is to be set on open sea then it seem acceptable to have a rule for crossing the T, senario specific.

The Hood is an other story : she wasn't prevented to fire by the PoW ( or the other side ), she was heading toward the Bismarck to close range as soon as possible so can't used her aft gun.
I didn't think that a trio of Richelieu at somethink like counter contact, 1000 m ( 1" ) one of the other would suffer from that. ( But if they closing against someting like a pair of Littorio and Have a third appearing in their back they may have a problem )

I agree about the Richelieu, it would not have had any main weapons masked while it closed with the Bismarck, but my case is still valid that while the Hood was closing range for its own protection it suffered the effects of being crossed by the German warships.
 
I may be wrong but i'm not convinced that's the effect of being crossed. If the Hood and PoW cross the German, the Hood may turn to close range and the german turn to be able to fire all main gun. Then the situation may be the same.
No edge of table to prevent this :P
 
BuShips I bow to your more in depth reading into naval history but have some additional comments.

I'll only agree that crossing the T was moot after WW2 ended, with the dominance of aircraft, submarines and cruise missiles.

While I agree that this is when military doctrine was officially changed and the manuals rewritten. I suspect that the actual lessons were learned the hard way in war.

It is a common failing that crossing the T is referenced to the age of pre-steel warships.

It does not surprise me that the term crossing the 'T' was not used until after the age of sail. It was my, perhaps erroneous, understanding that a closer ranged version of the tactic was the unrealizable dream of this earlier age. I believe that most major napolionic naval engagements were stalemates in which the protagists' lines of battle sailed in parallel at ranges to great for the weapons of the time to be effective.

Even Nelson himself did not "cross the T" at Trafalgar, as he actually did the reverse by closing with the opposite line at the bottom of the T and risking the chance (properly as it turned out) that they would fire at long range and miss. This allowed his Victory and his following ships to "break the line" and thus was able to rake the enemy ships and then came alongside of them.

Agreed. Nelsons tactics at Trafalgar (1805) broke the biggest rule of contemporary Naval Doctrine (not sailing bow on to the enemy). It paid off but had it failed, and he survived, it is (in my opinion) likely he would have suffered the same fate as Admiral Byng.

Nontheless, Nelson is credited with inventing the tactic I believe.

The naval dotrine I have in mind pre dated Nelson. I accept that this may not have been known as "crossing the T" but it did share its main characteristic, i.e. sailing your line of battle past the bows of the enemy's (not as impossblie as you might think given the correct weather gauge, and a stupid enemy admiral)

The crossing of the T maneuver however, was only brought into existance with the advent of fast steel-hulled ships with long-range turreted guns. By obtaining a position with its own line at the head of an opposite force and perpendicular to it (either off of the bow or the stern) the entire force could use its entire broadsides of turret-trainable weapons to place concentrated enfilade-fire upon the lead ship of the enemy line. In return, the enemy lead ship could only return fire with its forward armament. Then, each enemy ship could be dealt with in detail as they exposed themselves. So really, with the advancement in technology of fast steam-powered ships armed with movable turrets, the naval tactic of crossing the T only came into proper use during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The crux of the question of the validity of the tactic in the period in question (1900-1945) comes down to a trade off. In crossing the bows of an opponant you limit him to his forward firing turrets, but you also present an easier, broadside, target compared to the the bow on aspect he is showing you. I believe that in the game rules as they stand these factors cancel each other out so little overall advantage is gained by either side.

Is this historically accurate?

Obviously if you are talking about lines of battle the enemy's following ships will be further hindered by the lead vessels but this just brings the validity of the line of battle as a fighting formation into question.

Consider these following sentences and tell me if you think they relate to Nelson's age:

Maneuver. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the feasible application of combat power. Use of maneuver (mobility) capitalizes on the speed and agility of our forces (platforms and weapons) to gain an advantage in time and space relative to the enemy's vulnerabilities. Whether seen in historic warships "crossing the T," or modern ground forces enveloping an enemy, or forcing the tempo of combat beyond an adversary's ability to respond, maneuver allows us to get ahead of the enemy in several dimensions. Our advantage comes from exploiting the maneuver differential - our superiority in speed and position relative to our adversary.

This is not disimilar to an element teachings of T'sun T'su and applies to all war in all ages, Napolionic naval warfare included. It is only inapplicable because it claims "our superiority in speed and position relative to our adversary".

(As an aside where does this leave the rules in which there is little difference in maneuverability and the Italian fleet, which could also rightfully claim a similar advantage?)

and here-

New Tactics and Doctrine

The third key innovation in Japan's naval transformation efforts was the development of naval tactics that could take advantage of the new battle fleet's capabilities. Instrumental to the development of Japanese naval tactics was the Japanese Naval Staff College, founded in 1888. The college, still in its infancy during the Sino-Japanese War, was the foundation and promoter of revolutionary naval thought before the Russo-Japanese War.

The college taught naval theory, stressing naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan's concept of decisive battle, while also emphasizing the practical application of naval tactics and the ability of officers to think and make decisions in the heat of battle. Japanese naval thinkers of the day used the existing body of Western naval thought, their own experience, and the results of extensive wargaming to shape their tactics. Central to the formation of naval tactics for the combined fleet was the assumption that Japanese warships would be faster and more maneuverable than those of their adversaries. Given what Japanese tacticians knew about their potential enemies' larger, heavier, older ships, this was not a flawed assumption.


These comments are based on direct reference to historical facts specific to the 1930s an 40s so have little bearing on the age of sail (though the "ability of officers to think and make decisions in the heat of battle" has been valid throughout history).

In devising their tactics, the Japanese realized that the best position for achieving the maximum concentration of fires from their naval column was to place their column at a fight angle to that of the enemy, forming the cross bar of the letter T. As British Admiral Jackie Fisher noted during fleet maneuvers in 1901, "The lesson that has been emphasized is that the one all important, immediate imperative step is to form the fleet in one single line at right angles to the direction in which the enemy is sighted.... If both sides practice this golden rule and employ the single line of bearing then the fleet with the superior speed must win; that is, battleships of superior speed'.

What if, contrary to Fisher's assertion, one fleet sails abreast, rather than in line of battle? This basically brings us back to the "crux" mentioned above.

Simply stated, the tactic of crossing the T of an enemy line of ships was the single best tactic that exploited "concentration of firepower". If anyone thinks line formations were not used in the 20th century, simply look at most of the photos that exist of steel ships in formations and in battle reports.

By assuming the Line of Battle formation in the enemy the "crossing the T tactic automatically concentrated all your firefower on a single target, an ideal situation. In practice it should never work because all the outmaneuvered admiral need do to prevent disaster is to break his line of battle; not a particularly difficult task given the relatively few ships usually fielded in the line of battle. After all as the fleet cloing with the enemy he does have the initiative.

Is there any decisive naval battle in which a true crossing of the T was achieved?

Keith, please understand that I'm not 'jumping down your throat' in my long answer; it's more that your assertion got me wanting to explain my viewpoint to you and any others reading these discussions with some assertions of my own :D.

Thats what these forums are for.[/quote]
 
The crux of the question of the validity of the tactic in the period in question (1900-1945) comes down to a trade off. In crossing the bows of an opponant you limit him to his forward firing turrets, but you also present an easier, broadside, target compared to the the bow on aspect he is showing you. I believe that in the game rules as they stand these factors cancel each other out so little overall advantage is gained by either side


But wouldn't you still achieve a "weight of fire" advantage by bringing more guns to bear? I think that would be the determining factor, so crossing the T is still a valid option.
 
Although I could name resQscooter as a "kindred spirit" and assign him easily to my battle formation against all comers (lol) and :roll:, I'll just say that Keith's comments were well thought out :wink:. I like this because it gives my mind a bit of stretching, and it could use that exercise from time to time. It helps to sharpen the wit, after all. I'll still say that with all of the naval engagements that occurred in the Pacific during WW2, if you carefully study battles from Java Sea through the Solomons and later in Surigao Straight, the evidence is quite extant. I'll admit that for many years I thought the tactic of crossing the T was just recycled. My first hint was discovering the differences in efficiency between short ranged fire and fixed broadside guns and the later combined advantage of fast speed (giving one more opportunity in maneuvers) and long range fire (again, more firing opportunities) and finally (and this is a big deal) powerful naval guns mounted in trainable turrets. Sure, acheiving the position at the top of the T was as good as history had taught, but being able to concentrate an entire squadron's firepower down upon the lead ship of an opposing squadron was tantamount to a decapitation. Many times this ship could be the squadron flagship, but it surely was the ship that set the pace for the squadron's movement (called the "guide" ship). Losing headway fast and falling out of formation (or just blowing up) was a surefire method of creating havoc amongst the following ships. I need not beat this to death, but I did very much like your thoughts on the matter, Keith. Oh, you too resQscooter and Hugbiel! :D
 
Nontheless, Nelson is credited with inventing the tactic I believe

He didn't invent it, he just enjoyed the greatest successof the age when using it (similar tactics were employed at the battle of Kamperduin in 1797 by Admiral Duncan)
 
What Nelson brought to the equation was a far more aggressive fighting style designed to annihilate the enemy for greater strategic goals. Very simply put he does for naval warfare what Napoleon does for land warfare. Nelson is different to all those before him. He does not invent "crossing the T", this is a slight misconception of the war at sea throughout the sailing era. Effective fighting distances are very short, the sort of long range gunnery advantage which could have been obtain in this way would have been ineffective.

The line of battle was essentially a defensive formation introduced to counter superior sailing abilities by the Dutch in the 1650s. Although it allows a great concentration of force this comes a a price of flexibility. However, its success against smaller, lighter Dutch ships means that it is subsequently seen as the norm.

Generally speaking naval warfare for the next 150 years is largely a limited affair (just like on land) with better trained and handled RN squadrons trying first trying to form a line and then engage enemy squadrons while they are not interested in a battle and retreating. The result is largely inconclusive engagements. Nelson, knowing that the fighting efficacy of his units is far superior, dispenses with this and goes straight for the enemy ships. Trafalgar was about breaking into the Franco-Spanish line and defeating ships individually in close quarter combat. This is not what crossing the T is about.

Battleships were not wholly obsolete at the end of WWII, they still remained the greatest concentration of naval power afloat. As a weapon system they had their vulnerabilities - but which does not - naval aviation despite the great advances during the war was still more limited than one is led to believe. The reason why they were quickly withdrawn from service was because the two largest naval powers, the US and Britain were effectively allies, and no other nations could field units of comparable power. The Soviet Union had no BBs, US/UK had undisputed command of the sea thus it was a matter of find ways of using sea-power to project force onto land against the Soviet heartland.
 
Just a closing remark regurding my sources. These are primarily the authors' notes of 2 board wargames from Avalon Hill ("Jutland" and "Wooden Ships and Iron Men") backed up by my experience of playing these and VaS.
 
DM said:
Nontheless, Nelson is credited with inventing the tactic I believe

He didn't invent it, he just enjoyed the greatest successof the age when using it (similar tactics were employed at the battle of Kamperduin in 1797 by Admiral Duncan)

Yes, I'll agree with that. I'm sure the tactic occured originally to the same person that thought it would be a good idea to form ships in lines, and then thought right after that of how to defeat it :lol:. I actually think Nelson used somethng called "Breaking the Line" which was at the start of the manuver the exact opposite of crossing the T. I think some sources defined that as the "T" in their telling of it (which I would call a "+" tactic, lol) At the point of intersecting the enemy line and raking the ships as he broke through there is a similar effect, but at point blank range. Jellicoe has made some very good comments as well. :D
 
Keith said:
Just a closing remark regurding my sources. These are primarily the authors' notes of 2 board wargames from Avalon Hill ("Jutland" and "Wooden Ships and Iron Men") backed up by my experience of playing these and VaS.

It appears as though gaming is your primary reference, by your comments. My own perspective was a love of History first, and from that moving to gaming as a way of acting out these historic events to see how I might have fared as either commander. For me at least, History is a driving force behind my enjoyment of the gaming hobby. I suppose an exception to that is science fiction, where you game something before it ever happened, and are then creeped out in your old age when you see the Mars Civil War that you played out in your youth :lol:.
 
Of course Nelson's tactic could better be described as "forming a pi" given that he approached the Allied line with two line sof his own :)

Hmm, Nelson Pie :D
 
What about the battle of Tsushima.. In this battle Japan maybe won because of thier ability to "cross the T" and of course some other things. (ships etc)

quote from wikipedia:

The Russian fleet was in poor shape for a naval battle. Apart from the four newest Borodino class battleships, the ships were older designs and ill-maintained. The long voyage and the lack of opportunity for maintenance meant their bottoms were heavily fouled, significantly reducing their speed. The Japanese ships could reach 16 knots (30 km/h), but the Russian fleet could reach only 8 knots (15 km/h). Togo was able to use the better maneuverability of his fleet to advantage, "crossing the T" twice.

/Jonas
 
Minor techical point about Trafalgar and the fleet dispositions as the battle was joined. It was the combined French and Spanish fleet that was crossing Nelsons "T" s.

If crossing the "T" is so effective should the +1 to hit a ship showing you its beam apply to gunnery?
 
DM said:
Of course Nelson's tactic could better be described as "forming a pi" given that he approached the Allied line with two line sof his own :)

Hmm, Nelson Pie :D

DM, you are quite right! But let me add that your pie needs to be inverted when compared with the "T". In other words, if the superior advantage is to be at the top, then your pie should be flipped (Um, "flipped Nelson pie?").


jas_99 said:
What about the battle of Tsushima.. In this battle Japan maybe won because of thier ability to "cross the T" and of course some other things. (ships etc)

quote from wikipedia:

The Russian fleet was in poor shape for a naval battle. Apart from the four newest Borodino class battleships, the ships were older designs and ill-maintained. The long voyage and the lack of opportunity for maintenance meant their bottoms were heavily fouled, significantly reducing their speed. The Japanese ships could reach 16 knots (30 km/h), but the Russian fleet could reach only 8 knots (15 km/h). Togo was able to use the better maneuverability of his fleet to advantage, "crossing the T" twice.

/Jonas

Perfect example, jas_99! If this were a card game, I'd say "Two T's (TT) beats one ∏", even an inverted one. :wink:


Keith said:
Minor techical point about Trafalgar and the fleet dispositions as the battle was joined. It was the combined French and Spanish fleet that was crossing Nelsons "T" s.

If crossing the "T" is so effective should the +1 to hit a ship showing you its beam apply to gunnery?

Keith, I literally cringed when I saw that rule. Not only was there no mention of my pet tactic in the rulebook, that feature twisted the knife into its absense. My fear was that the Ghost of Nelson was hovering over the designer's shoulder, whispering "yes, give the ship pointed at the top of the T an advantage in gunnery". :? You and DM are very accurate in that Nelson attacked with two lines and "broke the line" of the French and Spanish fleet. Where some historians credit Nelson with the "crossing the T" tactic is at the point of breaking into the line (which was properly crossing him just a bit before) he had intersected between enemy ships and let fly with his cannon in a raking fire that some would at that point have called "crossing their T". Anyway, Nelson died knowing he had won regardless of what tactic the history books would say he used. In VaS, you can "sort of" achieve crossing the T, but not nearly as well as you should be able to. If you aceive the crossing position either off of the enemy bow or stern, you halve there return fire while allowing your own full armament. If there was simply Line of Sight rules that treated the ships counters or miniatures like the smoke counters in the game, then in a perfect T you would only be receiving 1/2 fire from the closest enemy ship. The balance of their formation would be blocked from firing as they would be firing through their own line. In my own games I'll be sure to determine that all smoke and ship counters are to be considered as "opaque" rather than "transparent" counters. In tourney play, I can live with the misery :D.
 
The more I think about it the more I'm tempted to either remove the +1 for beam-on attacks, or just apply it to firing from any angle :)
 
The +1 beam attack makes perfect sense for torpedo attacks and flat trajectory gunnery (or maybe it should be a -1 for a bow or stern attack) but is highly qestionable for ballistic gunnery. I think it important to make the distinction between the two.
 
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