Spaceships: Light Fighter
Effectiveness advantages[edit]
The modern view of light/lightweight fighters is as a capable weapon intended to satisfy the main criteria of air-to-air combat effectiveness,[8][9][10][11][12] which in order of importance, are:
1. Achieving superiority in the element of surprise, to be aware of the enemy before they are aware of you. In past combats, surprise advantage has been mostly based upon small visual and radar signatures, and having good visibility out of the cockpit. Surprise is a significant advantage, since historically in about 80% of air-to-air kills, the victim was unaware of the attacker until too late.[13][19]
As the former editor of 'The Topgun Journal', the author asked hundreds of pilots over a six-year period what single advantage they would like to have, that is, longer-range missiles, more guns, better maneuverability, etc. To a pilot they all said 'The first sighting.'
James Stevenson, The Pentagon Paradox.[20]
Small fighters like the F-5 with a planform area of about 300 square feet (28 m2) or the F-16 at about 400 square feet (37 m2), compared to about 1,050 square feet (98 m2) for the F-15,[21] have a much lower visual profile. The small fighter is typically invisible to opposing pilots beyond about 4 miles (6.4 km), whereas a larger fighter such as the F-15 is visible to about 7 miles (11 km).[22] This is a non-linear advantage to the light fighter at similar altitude and more if aircraft at different altitudes. Additionally, smaller targets take longer to visually acquire even if they are visible.[23] These two factors together give the light fighter pilot much better statistical odds of seeing the heavy fighter first and setting up a decisive first shot.[24] Once the small fighter sees and turns towards the opponent its very small frontal area reduces maximum visual detection range to about 2 to 2.5 miles (3.2 to 4.0 km).[14][25]
Given similar technology, smaller fighters typically have about two thirds the radar range against the same target as heavy fighters.[e] However, this cannot be counted upon to give the large fighter a winning advantage, as larger fighters with typical radar cross sectional area of about 10 square metres (110 sq ft) are detectable by a given radar at about 50% farther range than the 2 to 3 square metres (22 to 32 sq ft) cross section of the light fighter.[26] This approximately balances these trade-offs, and can sometimes favor the lightweight fighter. For example, from the front the F-15 actually presents about 20 square metres (220 sq ft) radar cross sectional area,[27] and has been typically defeated by opposing F-16 forces not only in close dogfighting combat, but also in extensive Beyond Visual Range (BVR) trials.[3][28] Also, airborne fighter radars are limited: their coverage is only to the front, and are far from perfect in detecting enemy aircraft. Although radar was extensively used by the United States in the Vietnam War, only 18% of North Vietnamese fighters were first detected by radar, and only 3% by radar on fighter aircraft.[29] The other 82% were visually acquired.[30]
The modern trend to stealth aircraft is an attempt to maximize surprise in an era when Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles are becoming more effective than the quite low effectiveness BVR has had in the past.[31]
2. To have numerical superiority in the air, which implies the need for lower procurement cost, lower maintenance cost, and higher reliability. Not even taking into account the sometimes superior combat capability of lighter aircraft based on surprise and maneuverability, the pure numbers issue of lower cost and higher reliability (higher sortie rates) also tends to favor light fighters. It is a basic outcome of Lanchester's laws, or the salvo combat model, that a larger number of less-sophisticated units will tend to be successful over a smaller number of more advanced ones; the damage dealt is based on the square of the number of units firing, while the quality of those units has only a linear effect on the outcome. This non-linear relationship favors the light and lightweight fighter.[32]
Additionally, as pilot capability is actually the top consideration in maximizing total effectiveness of the pilot-aircraft system,[f] the lower purchase and operational cost of light fighters permits more training, thus delivering more effective pilots.[33] For example, as of 2013, total heavy F-15C operating cost is reported at US$41,900 per hour, and light F-16C cost at US$22,500 per hour.[34]
3. To have superior maneuverability, which in maneuvering combat allows getting into superior position to fire and score the kill. [35][36][37][38][39] This is a function of achieving lower wing loading, higher thrust to weight ratio, and superior aerodynamics.[40][41][42] This is sometimes described colloquially as “wrapping the smallest possible airframe around the most powerful available engine.”[43] Professional analysis through 4th generation fighters shows that among heavier fighters only the F-15 has been generally competitive with lighter fighters, and its maneuvering performance is exceeded by several lighter fighters such as the F-16.[44][45] Light fighters have no inherent aerodynamic advantage for speed and range, but when designed to be as simple as possible they do tend to have lower wing loading and higher thrust to weight ratio.[46] Additionally, smaller fighters are lower in inertia, allowing a faster transient response in maneuvering combat.[47]
4. Weapon systems effectiveness.[48][49][50] This area is one where the light fighter can be at a disadvantage, since the combat load of a single engine light fighter is typically about half of a twin engine heavy fighter. However, modern single engine light fighters such as the General Dynamics F-16 Fighting Falcon and the Saab JAS 39 Gripen generally carry similar cannon and air-to-air missile fighter weapons as heavier fighters. Actual aerial combat in the modern era is of short duration, typically about two minutes,[51] and as only a small fraction of this is spent actually firing, modest weapons load outs are generally effective. The ideal weapons load for a modern fighter is considered to be an internal gun and two to four guided missiles,[52] a load that modern light fighters are fully capable of while maintaining high agility. For example, the JAS 39 Gripen, despite being the lightest major fighter in current production, carries a combat load of an 27mm cannon and up to six air-to-air missiles of the same types as carried by heavy fighters. Additionally, combat experience shows that weapons systems "effectiveness" has not been dominated by the amount of weaponry or "load out", but by the ability to achieve split second kills when in position to do so.[53][54][55]
Concept summary[edit]
Superior technology has often been quoted as a strong factor favoring the heavy fighter. The specific argument usually presented is that heavy fighters have superior radar range and longer range BVR missiles that take advantage of that range. This radar range advantage is one of the major reasons for the existence of the modern heavy fighter, but it has not turned out to be a significant advantage in air combat history to date for several reasons. A major reason has been because long range BVR missile shots have often been unusable, and often unreliable when they could be taken. The weight of the larger missiles also reduces performance and range needed to get in position to fire. Due to these factors, between 1958 and 1982 in five wars there were 2,014 missile firings by fighter pilots engaged in air-to-air combat in five wars, but there were only four beyond-visual-range kills.[56]
The more general and often misunderstood argument for more technology that has been historically assumed to favor heavy fighters is not just better radar but better systems support for the fighter pilot in other ways as well. Examples include all weather capability, precise electronic navigation, electronic counter-measures, data-linking for improved information awareness, and automation to lighten pilot workload and keep the pilot focused on tasks essential to combat.[57] This was a compelling argument, as the greatest factor in the effectiveness of a fighter plane has always been the pilot. Quoting a prominent reference, "Throughout the history of air combat, a few outstanding fighter pilots, typically less than five percent of the whole, have run up large scores at the expense of their less gifted brethren. The numerical imbalance was such that a large number of high scorers was needed. The quest was on to turn each fighter pilot into an ace, and technology seemed the easiest, and the only way to achieve it. This was the idea underlying the first two American superfighters; the F-14 Tomcat and the F-15 Eagle.”[58]
While the technology advantage for heavy fighters that better supported the pilot may well have been a valid point in the 1970s (when the F-14 and F-15 first entered service), this advantage has not been maintained over time. Engine performance improvements have improved load carry capability,[g] and with more compact electronics, the lightweight fighter has, from the 1980s onwards, had similar pilot enhancing technical features.[59][60][61] The lightweight fighter carries equally effective weapons including BVR missiles, and has similar combat range and persistence. The modern lightweight fighter achieves these competitive features while still maintaining the classic advantages of better surprise, numbers, and maneuverability. Thus, the lightweight fighter natural advantages have remained in force despite the addition of more technology to air combat.[60]
Due to their lower costs, modern light fighters equip the air forces of many smaller nations. However, as budgets have limits for all nations, the optimum selection of fighter aircraft weight, complexity, and cost is an important strategic issue even for wealthy nations. The budgetary and strategic significance of light fighters is illustrated by the defense investment at stake. As an example where well referenced data is available, though numerous trial and combat references consider the lightweight F-16 to be as good or better on a per plane as the excellent but expensive F-15,[62] [63] fielding and maintaining a light fighter force based on the F-16 is approximately half the cost of the same number of F-15’s. The US Air Force reports the total loaded cost per hour (as of 2013) of operating the F-16 to be ~US$22,500 per hour.[34] Numerous authoritative sources report that it takes about 200 to 400 flight hours per year to maintain fighter pilot proficiency.[h][64]
It becomes a question of costs:
1. Acquisition
2. Operating
3. Human resources
4. Infrastructure
You can buy a more expensive variant, but know that the operating costs, and nowadays, service life extension programmes whether by shrinking components, or more likely, enough slack in the airframe for improved electronics, instead of buying a new aircraft to replace it.
A smaller size would allow less factory space and hangar area, meaning more could be produced or squeezed into a given volume, which is an issue in Traveller spaceships.
Then, how many personnel would be needed to crew the vessel, and how many to maintain it.