Demo Report: Battle of the River Plate
- Thread starter Dredd Times
- Start date
DM said:
Having major fleet assets threaten the South Coast (especially as the Luftwaffe bases would be close enough to use their dominance in airpower effectively) would inevitably draw the fleet out - not to do so would be a virtual invitation to be invaded (especially considering the lack of anything resembling a decent army at the time having lost a lot of men and more importantly material in France).
If Hitler reneged on the Armistace terms (not unlikely) suddenly the scenario becomes a real possibility. If Hitler had believed the British were going to fight on alone after the fall in France rather than make peace then he probably would have ensured the French Fleet be turned over or leased at the armistace itself.
The thought of this happening is why the attack took place in the first place.
OK. I wonder if the Germans had any real chance of activating a significant portion of any ships that they may have got their hands on? Alao, as it turned out, the French were quite effective at ensuring that the armistice conditions were kept, and did a good job of scuttling the fleet at Toulon when Vichy was occupied.
captainsmirk
Mongoose
The likelihood of a German invasion of Britain al-la Operation Sealion were actually pretty low. Whilst the effective loss of the Battle of Britain was used as excuse to cancel the op the real reason was that the German commanders could see that the chances of success for such an invasion were very low. The Germans did not have the amphibious capacity the Allies had on D-Day. The craft they were going to use were Rhine river barges unsuited to sea travel let alone amphibious assault. They would also have had to do without that staple of Blitzkreig tactics, their armour until the captured a port in which to land it.
Plus the British countryside is not the best terrain for practicing Blitzkreig anyway.
Although if they had established a bridgehead they could have succeeded but a set of wargames representing the scenario in the 1970s, where veteruns from both sides commanded their respective forces showed that establishing a bridgehead in the first place would have been extremely difficult and prohibitively costly. I believe that the German team gave up eventually.
Nick
Plus the British countryside is not the best terrain for practicing Blitzkreig anyway.
Although if they had established a bridgehead they could have succeeded but a set of wargames representing the scenario in the 1970s, where veteruns from both sides commanded their respective forces showed that establishing a bridgehead in the first place would have been extremely difficult and prohibitively costly. I believe that the German team gave up eventually.
Nick
captainsmirk said:
With the naval forces available that is very true. With the powerful French navy under German control then the dynamics chance dramatically.
The Germans had lost too many ships in the attack upon Norway to ever have had much hope of a successful invasion, which is why Narvik was so important as well.
Which was recognised at the time resulting in the removal of the French fleet as a possible threat by the British both at Mers-el-Kebir and Alexandria.
As far as Blitzkreig is concerned - well most of Hitler's conquests were not really Blitzkreig as imagined in the popular imagination. The attack in the low countries and France, plus Barbarosa were both true Blitzkreigs, Norway, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia were not. The German military were more than adaptable enough to defeat an exhausted enemy army if they had the chance. Without the French fleet they would never get the opportunity.
DM said:
Because of Mers-el-Kebir we will never know. (And why leave it to chance....). Like I said it is fun to have conjecture.
Mers-el-Kebir was also important largely because it gained the UK significant political capital in the US, ensuring that Britain 'got the tools to do the job'.
captainsmirk
Mongoose
Mongoose Acolyte said:
It wasn't naval ships that were the problem, it was amphibious landing craft. The French had no more of those than the Germans did (i.e. None), they couldn't land any heavy equipment (tanks, artillery, supplies) until they had captured a port, something which would have to be achieved entirely by infantry with the equipment they could carry.
On D-Day the allies had both amphibious tanks and landing craft capable of carrying others (plus they brought their own portable harbour).
A very difficult operation even with a larger fleet at their disposal (and ultimately not something they were willing to divert resources from Hitler's eastern expansions for, Britain not appearing that much of a threat at the time).
Still makes interesting What If's though
Nick
Celisasu
Mongoose
Yeah, I've read both of those.Chernobyl said:
I just wish that his World War Novels(the Settling Accounts books) would hurry and fall into the cheap $7 novels instead of staying as $15-30 ones. Three books and none of them have gone to regular paperback yet(just those giant paperbacks that are still overpriced).
Key naval engagments of WWII:
Midway - certainly one of the most decisive naval battles of WWII, and one where the underdog actually one. It dwarfed any of the naval engagements in the Atlantic or Med.
Pearl Harbor - 'nuf said
Convoy ONS-5, the turning point in the Battle of Atlantic and the beginning of the end of the Wolfpacks.
Taranto - the blue print for the Pearl Harbor attack, and the knock out blow to Italian ambition in the Med
Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history. Particularly the action off Samar, where the heroic Taffy squadrons of Jeep carrier drove off Kurita's task force including the leviathan Yamato, and the Battle of Surigao Strait, where the Pearl Harbor battleships executed a japanese task force in the last classic crossing the T maneuver.
Battle of Coral Sea - the first carrier vs carrier duel, and the end of the Japanese threat against Australia and New Zealand.
The Battle of Denmark Straight - the death of the Hood, but more importantly also the end of the German surface raider threat
I wouldn't put either Narvik or Cape Matapan as particularly important battles.
The Pacific theatre was far more important in terms of naval actions than the Atlantic - the fleets involved were larger, and often without significant land based air presence the ships themselves decided the outcome, even if it was done by carrier wing.
Midway - certainly one of the most decisive naval battles of WWII, and one where the underdog actually one. It dwarfed any of the naval engagements in the Atlantic or Med.
Pearl Harbor - 'nuf said
Convoy ONS-5, the turning point in the Battle of Atlantic and the beginning of the end of the Wolfpacks.
Taranto - the blue print for the Pearl Harbor attack, and the knock out blow to Italian ambition in the Med
Battle of Leyte Gulf, the largest naval battle in history. Particularly the action off Samar, where the heroic Taffy squadrons of Jeep carrier drove off Kurita's task force including the leviathan Yamato, and the Battle of Surigao Strait, where the Pearl Harbor battleships executed a japanese task force in the last classic crossing the T maneuver.
Battle of Coral Sea - the first carrier vs carrier duel, and the end of the Japanese threat against Australia and New Zealand.
The Battle of Denmark Straight - the death of the Hood, but more importantly also the end of the German surface raider threat
I wouldn't put either Narvik or Cape Matapan as particularly important battles.
The Pacific theatre was far more important in terms of naval actions than the Atlantic - the fleets involved were larger, and often without significant land based air presence the ships themselves decided the outcome, even if it was done by carrier wing.
demiurge, you hit on quite a few of the key battles, but I might add the entire sequence of the many battles for Guadalcanal (and I'm sure you'd agree). As you might very well know this string of battles continued what the U.S. victory at Midway started, namely stopping the Imperial Japanese juggernaut and then rolling it back whence it came. Although obtaining a stunning victory with the first run of the "Tokyo Express" at the Battle of Savo Island, the Japanese did not exploit their victory by then attacking the allied transports, which were saved from destruction. The followup brawls of the Battles of Cape Esperance, First and Second Guadalcanal and Tassafaronga, while not all U.S. victories, did indeed reverse the Japanese "victory dominoes" that were falling towards Australia and New Zealand. It has been said by naval historians that before the Battle of Midway the Japanese knew only victory, but after Midway they knew only of defeat. The Battle of Midway turned the corner of the Pacific war, and the long road through the Solomon Islands and the Philippines sealed the fate of the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere."
In addition to demiurge's list for possible battles with VaS, add these terrific struggles to your "to do" list :wink: :
http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadal.htm
http://www.combinedfleet.com/solomon.htm
Combinedfleet.com is a fantastic resource to take advantage of:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/map.htm
In addition to demiurge's list for possible battles with VaS, add these terrific struggles to your "to do" list :wink: :
http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadal.htm
http://www.combinedfleet.com/solomon.htm
Combinedfleet.com is a fantastic resource to take advantage of:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/map.htm
Midway is an interesting one - I've seen it described both as the pivotal poit of the war and also as merely a step in an inevitable defeat and thus in itself not overly important. Personally I lean towards the former (although I shy away form the "incredible victory" - the battle really was a foregone conclusion that the US could have and nearly did throw away). However, I'd have said that, from a campaign perspective, the Battle of the Atlantic must be no. 1 - its just not that "sexy" and is difficult to wargame effectively unless you are a full-on naval wargamer with a thing for logistics (although I'm working on something at the moment.....)
BuShips - good stuff, and yes I definitely agree that the Guadalcanal Campaign was huge - and it's probably the best gaming setup, as the two fleets fought a long protracted series of struggles and were very nearly even in capabilities at the time. Great site too, thanks!
DM - I think it's a bit of a misnomer to say 'the Battle for the Atlantic' - it's the entire campaign in theatre really. To say the Battle for the Atlantic was the most important is like saying the War in the Pacific was... That's why I listed the specific engagements in the Atlantic campaign.
And I've never heard of Midway as a foregone conclusion before - the Japanese had the advantage all across the board materially and in experience, the only advantage the US had was intelligence. Of course, that's a huge one.
DM - I think it's a bit of a misnomer to say 'the Battle for the Atlantic' - it's the entire campaign in theatre really. To say the Battle for the Atlantic was the most important is like saying the War in the Pacific was... That's why I listed the specific engagements in the Atlantic campaign.
And I've never heard of Midway as a foregone conclusion before - the Japanese had the advantage all across the board materially and in experience, the only advantage the US had was intelligence. Of course, that's a huge one.
Soulmage
Mongoose
This guy claims that the Battle of Midway was irrelevant to the outcome of the Pacific War based on war production capabilities of Japan vs. the U.S.
I have to say he makes a very convincing argument.
Its a kinda long article but its interesting reading! Check it out!!
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
I have to say he makes a very convincing argument.
Its a kinda long article but its interesting reading! Check it out!!
http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
The US had a lot more than just intelligence. They outnumbered the japanese in aircraft for a start, had better designed ships, better tactics, better operating procedures, much better intelligence. The Japanese suffered from chronic mismanagement, loss of focus, poor planning. If you want an excellent analysis of the battle I'd suggest reading "Shattered Sword" by Parshall and Tully. It blows away a lot of the myths about the battle, as well as providing some excellent background material on carrier operating procedures.
Soulmage, that makes sense to me without even reading it (although of course I'll take a look at it :wink: ). It just would have taken the U.S. longer to fight their way back across the Pacific, that's all. Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto (who planned the attack on Pearl Harbor) was even cognizant of the industrial output potential of America. While a naval attache in Washington D.C., he toured Detroit and warned his superiors that Japan could not win a protracted war against the United States. Thus at first he protested and then went about his duty and planned the attack. Another factor at Midway was the absence of two of the original six carriers that were in the Pearl Harbor raiding force. The Shokaku and Zuikaku were damaged at the Coral Sea action and missed joining the Midway attack force. This acted to partially offset the loss of the large carrier Lexington which was sunk at that battle. Other possibilities that might have heavily influenced the outcome of Midway was the expeditious repair of the carrier Yorktown, which the Japanese thought had also been sunk at Coral Sea. That ship's speedy repairs and contributions were a miracle in itself, even without consideration of the code-breaking knowledge that the U.S. had. New ships were being built at incredible speeds in the U.S., to shortly join the American effort at reversing Japan's territorial gains. For example, I live about 45 miles from where Kaiser shipyards built FIFTY Casablanca class escort aircraft carriers. While not main fleet units, they filled the mid-ocean gap in the Battle of the Atlantic (yeah, I know it's really a campaign, but the Atlantic is a "pond" when compared to the Pacific, heh), providing convoy escort and as the core of hunter-killer groups used against U-boats. In the Pacific they supported the island-hopping amphibious campaigns that came to Japan's home waters. By the way, these 50 carriers were built in less than a year's time! In other U.S. yards, 39 additional CVE's, or 'jeep' carriers were delivered to the Royal Navy. In all, nearly 200 carriers of all sizes were built by the United States by the end of WW2. Just think about that number, chaps. There were 175 Fletcher class destroyers built as well, in addition to other types of warships, transports, MTBs and Higgins boats (!). Yamamoto was right!
